본 연구는 경영자 과신성향이 조세회피에 미치는 영향, 또한 ESG 및 그 구성인 환경(E), 사회적책임(S), 기업지배구조(G)가 조세회피에 미치는 영향 그리고 경영자 과신성향이 높을 때 ESG의 조절효과를 알아보는데 있다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 한국기업지배구조원의 ESG 평가자료를 이용하여 분석기간 2011년부터 2020년까지 상장기업을 대상으로 분석하였다. 분석결과는 첫째, 경영자 과신성향이 높을수록 BTD 계열의 조세회피 측정치만 유의한 양(+)의 관계를, 그러나 ETR 계열의 측정치는 유의한 관계가 나타나지 않았다. 둘째, ESG 등급은 ETR 계열보다 BTD 계열에서 양(+)의 관계가 나타났고, 앞서의 결과는 S보다 주로 E와 G에 기인한 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 조절효과를 알아본 경우 경영자 과신성향(MOC)과 ESG의 상호작용변수는 대체로 유의한 관계가 나타나지 않으나, ESG의 구성요소로 분석하면 E, S보다 G에서 주로 MOC*G는 BTD 계열의 조세회피와 음(-)의 관계로 나타났다. 마지막으로, 추가분석에서 ESG와 외부지배구조(예로, 외국인지분율)와의 결합효과는 조세회피 측정치와 유의한 결과가 관찰되지는 않았다.
요약하면, ESG 및 그 구성요소가 조세회피에 미치는 긍정적인 효과가 있는지를 직접효과, 조절효과 그리고 결합효과 측면에서 총체적으로 살펴본 결과는 ESG 자체는 이러한 증거를 발견할 수 없었다. 다만, ESG의 구성 중 G만 조절효과에서 경영자 과신성향이 있을 때 기업지배구조(G) 등급이 높은 기업은 그렇지 않은 경우보다 조세회피가 억제되는 것으로 나타났다. 최근 지속가능경영을 나타내는 ESG 개념이 실무계(예, 투자자, 규제기관 및 정책입안자)와 학계에서 그 관심이 높아진 상황에서 본 연구의 발견은 ESG가 조세회피에 미치는 효과에 대한 새로운 증거를 제공한다는 점에서 의미가 있다.
This study examine the relation between managerial overconfidence and tax avoidance, between ESG (environmental, social, and governance) and tax avoidance, and whether this relation is moderated by ESG (and/or E, S, G). Specifically, this study analyses whether the link between managerial overconfidence and tax avoidance is moderated by ESG and three factors of ESG (e.g., the ability and incentive to monitor managers’ tax avoidance decisions), we used as a proxy for corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, we examine the link between ESG, managerial overconfidence, and corporate tax avoidance. In particular, we expect that overconfident CEOs will be more likely to engage in tax avoidance. We expect ESG (E, S, G) to have a negative relation with tax avoidance. Moreover, we expect ESG (E, S, G) to have negatively moderates the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and tax avoidance. Using a sample of Korea listed firms from 2011 to 2020, and the sample was collected the ESG and/or E, S, G grade (e.g., A+, A, B+, B, C, D) evaluated by the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). Following Kim et al. (2016) is the firm-specific score developed by Schrand and Zechman (2012), our measure of managerial overconfidence, MOC, takes the value of one if the firm meets at least three of the following five criteria and zero otherwise. We use four short-term measures of tax avoidance (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala (2016) compute a measure of abnormal BTD by regressing total book-tax differences (hereafter BTD) on total accruals, BTD, Cash effective tax rate (ETR), and GAAP ETR) for a given year.
The empirical result of this study is as follow. First, overconfident managers are more likely to engage in tax avoidance behaviors when tax avoidance is mainly measured as BTD line (i.e., abnormal BTD, BTD) than ETR line (i.e., Cash ETR, GAAP ETR). Second, inconsistent with our expectation, we find that ESG grade has a positive influence on tax avoidance. Moreover, by dividing the three different factors of ESG, E (environmental) and G (corporate governance) has the positive impact on tax avoidance, respectively. But these results depending on the measure of tax avoidance (i.e., BTD line vs. ETR line) differs. Third, we do not find that high-grade ESG negatively moderates the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and tax avoidance. Merely, by dividing the three factors of ESG, we find that firms with higher level of G (corporate governance) grade negatively moderates the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and tax avoidance in comparison to E (environmental) and S (social) when BTD line is the measure of tax avoidance. Lastly, in additional analysis, we do not find that firms with higher level of foreign ownership negatively moderates the positive relation between ESG (E, S, G) and tax avoidance in terms of the positive combined effect of ESG and external corporate governance.
In sum, there is a clear global trend of increased sustainability reporting, recently. In the capital market recognizes the increasingly critical importance of transparent, accurate and comparable ESG data for the financial industry. Thus, ESG performance as a positive image for external information users such as investors, regulatory authority, and policymakers interest in ESG activity grew rapidly, and also known as sustainability management. In this situation, we investigates whether a positive effect of ESG affects relatively low level of corporate tax avoidance in terms of direct effect, moderating effect, and combined effect. However, taken as a whole, we fail to find evidence a negative relation between ESG and tax avoidance. Our study provide a contribution on the relationship between ESG as an indicator of sustainability management and tax avoidance behavior, we extending the prior research focused on ESG regarding direct effect, moderating effect, and combined effect contexts. Our findings also could be useful for participants of the capital market (e.g., investors, regulatory authority, and policymakers etc.). Further, our results provide additional and novel evidence that both overconfident CEOs and G (corporate governance) in the ESG as interactive aspects play significant roles in determining companies’ tax avoidance behavior.